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This paper describes a study where a new X-ray machine for security screening featuring
motion imaging (i.e., 5 views of a bag are shown as an image sequence) was evaluated
and compared to single view imaging available on conventional X-ray screening systems.
More specifically, it was investigated whether with this new technology X-ray screening
of passenger bags could be enhanced to such an extent that laptops could be left inside
passenger bags, without causing a significant impairment in threat detection performance.
An X-ray image interpretation test was created in four different versions, manipulating the
factors packing condition (laptop and bag separate vs. laptop in bag) and display condition
(single vs. motion imaging). There was a highly significant and large main effect of packing
condition. When laptops and bags were screened separately, threat item detection was
substantially higher. For display condition, a medium effect was observed. Detection could
be slightly enhanced through the application of motion imaging. There was no interaction
between display and packing condition, implying that the high negative effect of leaving
laptops in passenger bags could not be fully compensated by motion imaging. Additional
analyses were carried out to examine effects depending on different threat categories
(guns, improvised explosive devices, knives, others), the placement of the threat items
(in bag vs. in laptop) and viewpoint (easy vs. difficult view). In summary, although motion
imaging provides an enhancement, it is not strong enough to allow leaving laptops in bags
for security screening.
Keywords: aviation security, X-ray screening, threat detection, human factors, motion imaging, multiple views,
laptop screening
INTRODUCTION
A secure air transportation system is vital for society and econ-
omy. Aviation security measures have been increased substantially
in response to several successful and attempted terrorist attacks
since September 11, 2001. One major aspect in this field is the
mandatory process of baggage screening using X-ray machines.
Before entering the secure area of an airport, all passengers, as well
as members of airline and airport staff have to pass the security
checkpoints to have themselves and all their belongings screened.
The security checkpoint is a socio-technical system consisting of
human and technical elements, working together. The goal is that
no threat items are brought past security checkpoints and onto an
airplane. Strong efforts are being made in order to improve and
further develop X-ray screening equipment. Yet, the final deci-
sion whether threat items are contained in the baggage still relies
on human operators (screening officers) who visually inspect the
X-ray images provided by the machine. As a consequence, man-
machine system performance depends on human factors and
display technology (e.g., Bolfing et al., 2008; Koller et al., 2008;
von Bastian et al., 2008, 2010; Michel and Schwaninger, 2009;
Graves et al., 2011). When evaluating new technological devel-
opments with regard to their added value for security screening
purposes, this should be taken into account appropriately (see
also Yoo and Choi, 2006; Yoo, 2009).
In X-ray screening, three image-based factors have been iden-
tified as relevant for human operators to detect threat items in
X-ray images (Schwaninger, 2003b; Hardmeier et al., 2005, 2006;
Schwaninger et al., 2005a). The first one is the view difficulty of
an object, resulting from the position of a threat item in a bag
(effect of viewpoint). The second factor is the superposition of an
item by other objects contained in the bag (effect of superposi-
tion). The third factor refers to the complexity of a bag, which
depends on the number and type of objects in the bag (effect
of bag complexity). The intensity with which X-rays can pene-
trate through materials in a bag depends on the specific material
density of a substance (e.g., Brown et al., 1995). Therefore, the
material density of the items contained in a bag will also affect the
factors superposition and bag complexity and thus will influence
the difficulty to detect threat items. Schwaninger et al. (2005b)
have developed algorithms to automatically estimate X-ray image
difficulty based on viewpoint, superposition, and bag complexity.
Their algorithms were highly correlated with human perception
of the above mentioned image-based factors and could well pre-
dict human threat detection performance (see also Schwaninger
et al., 2007; Bolfing et al., 2008).
State-of-the-art X-ray screening equipment is able to provide
high quality images with good image resolution. Yet, the detec-
tion of threat items in X-ray images remains a challenging task
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for screening officers and becomes evenmore difficult when dense
objects, such as large electronic devices, are contained in the bag-
gage. Due to their compact construction, electronic devices (e.g.,
laptops) are hard to penetrate. Hence, they can conceal other parts
of luggage or could be used to intentionally hide threat items (e.g.,
an improvised explosive device, IED). Especially when single view
X-ray systems are used or even multi-view systems, if the addi-
tional views do not provide enough meaningful information, the
inspection becomes difficult. Threat items which are behind, in
front of, or hidden inside a laptop case become very challenging
or even impossible for human operators to recognize (see also von
Bastian et al., 2008). In a previous paper, Mendes et al. (2012)
documented how threat detection can be substantially impaired
when laptops are not taken out of passenger bags and a threat
item (e.g., an IED) is placed either behind, in front of, or within
a laptop. The present paper extends these results by investigating
how a new technology which allows presenting bags in multiple
views as an image sequence (i.e., motion imaging) could possibly
reduce such an impairment.
Considering the large number of views which can be pro-
duced by a single object, the question arises how objects can be
recognized when presented in unusual views. In the object recog-
nition literature, two types of theories can be distinguished (see
Peissig and Tarr, 2007; Kravitz et al., 2008): viewpoint-invariant
theories (e.g., Marr, 1982; Biederman, 1987) and viewpoint-
dependent theories (e.g., Poggio and Edelman, 1990; Bülthoff
and Edelman, 1992; Tarr, 1995). Most viewpoint-invariant the-
ories assume that objects are stored in visual memory by their
component parts and their spatial relationship (see Marr and
Nishihara, 1978; Biederman, 1987). Once a particular object has
been stored, recognition of that object should be unaffected
by the viewpoint (including novel viewpoints), given that the
necessary features can be recovered from this view (Burgund
and Marsolek, 2000). The viewpoint-dependent theories pro-
pose that objects are not stored in memory as rotation invari-
ant structural descriptions, but in a viewer centered format.
Thus, if an object has never been seen from a certain view-
point and is therefore not stored in visual memory, recognition
is impaired if view-invariant features are not available (Kosslyn,
1994; Bülthoff and Bülthoff, 2006; Schwaninger, 2005). Several
studies on viewpoint-dependent theories could show that view-
point can strongly affect recognition performance (e.g., Bülthoff
and Edelman, 1992; Edelman and Bülthoff, 1992; Humphrey and
Khan, 1992; Graf et al., 2002). Even though our visual percep-
tion can be considered highly robust with respect to changes
of viewpoint, we are more facile with certain views relative to
others, such as often encountered views and views that make
larger numbers of surfaces available (Palmer et al., 1981; Blanz
et al., 1999). Such views have also been referred to as “canon-
ical” views. Research in aviation security X-ray screening has
shown that threat items are easier to identify when depicted
in frontal (canonical) views than when horizontally or verti-
cally rotated (e.g., Michel et al., 2007; Bolfing et al., 2008; Koller
et al., 2008). Consequently, having machines featuring multiple
X-ray images of the same bag from different viewpoints could
ease recognition of threat items in passenger bags for screening
officers.
At present, most of the machines deployed at airports provide
single view images, which do not allow screening officers to ana-
lyze an image from different viewpoints. A human operator will
only be able to identify a threat item and make a correct decision
if the threat can be recognized in the provided single view image
(Schwaninger, 2003b; Schwaninger et al., 2005a; Graves et al.,
2011). Considering the above mentioned image based factors
(viewpoint, superposition and bag complexity) and the density of
electronic devices, it becomes evident whymost international and
national regulations specify that portable computers and other
large electronic devices shall be removed from passenger bags and
screened separately at security checkpoints (e.g., the current reg-
ulation of the European Comission, 2010). Based on the model
by Schwaninger et al. (2005b) one would predict that leaving
laptops in passenger bags results in decreases of threat detection
performance due to increases of superposition and bag complex-
ity. Threat items placed behind, in front of, or inside a laptop
could become very challenging for human operators to detect.
Moreover, recognition would become additionally challenging if
in the provided X-ray image the threat item would be depicted
from a difficult viewpoint (e.g., vertically or horizontally rotated).
This study was conducted to examine the above mentioned
effects by comparing conventional single view display technol-
ogy to a new technology. More specifically, a new X-ray screening
machine featuring “motion imaging” was tested. “Motion imag-
ing” means that five images are available, which are rotated
around the vertical axis. These can be either displayed in a short
video sequence or can each be statically viewed. In relation to the
initial image (0◦), the angles of the five images are −25◦, −12.5◦,
0◦, 12.5◦, 25◦ (see Figure 1).
One could hypothesize that through the application of motion
imaging and the availability of multiple views, recognition of
certain objects could become easier. There are several possi-
ble advantages dynamic displays may confer over static ones
(Vuong and Tarr, 2004). For example, object motionmay enhance
the recovery of information about shape (e.g., Ullmann, 1979).
Furthermore, it may provide observers with additional views of
objects (Pike et al., 1997), or it may allow observers to anticipate
views of objects (Mitsumatsu and Yokosawa, 2003). Moreover,
when objects rotate in depth, certain features can become visi-
ble while others become obscured (Vuong and Tarr, 2004). Thus,
FIGURE 1 | Example of motion imaging X-ray images provided by the
machine evaluated in this study. The image in the middle shows the
initial image (0◦).
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objects could become less superimposed and could possibly be
displayed from an easier viewpoint (i.e., from a more canonical
perspective).
The first goal of our study was to determine whether motion
imaging improves detection of threat items in passenger bags. The
second goal was to investigate whether leaving laptops in passen-
ger bags results in a decrease of detection performance (effect
of superposition and bag complexity), while the third goal was
to evaluate whether such an effect can be compensated when
motion imaging is available. Additional analyses were carried out
to examine effects depending on different threat categories (guns,
IEDs, knives, others), the placement of the threat items (in bag vs.
in laptop) and the viewpoint effect (easy vs. difficult view).
METHODS AND MATERIALS
An image interpretation test containing bags and laptops was cre-
ated in four versions to examine the factors display condition
(single vs. motion imaging) and packing condition (laptops inside
vs. laptops outside). Each test version differed with regard to these
two factors (see section Experimental Design). Four experimental
groups with certified screening officers were formed. Each group
conducted one of the test versions. Detection performance scores
and reaction times (RTs) of all groups were compared to evaluate
the effects of the above mentioned factors.
PARTICIPANTS
The study was conducted with 80 airport security screening
officers employed at an international European airport. All par-
ticipants were certified screeners, meaning they were all qualified,
trained and certified according to the standards set by the national
appropriate authority (civil aviation administration) and consis-
tent with the European Regulation (European Comission, 2010).
The screening officers were randomly distributed into four dif-
ferent experimental groups (A, B, C, and D, 20 per group).
Figure 2 illustrates the experimental design. In order to verify
that all experimental groups were comparable with regard to
the screeners’ X-ray image interpretation competency, all partici-
pants conducted the X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray
CAT) before the main experiment was carried out. The X-Ray
CAT for cabin baggage screening is a standardized instrument to
measure X-ray image interpretation competency of airport secu-
rity screening officers and has been applied in several previous
scientific studies (Koller and Schwaninger, 2006; Michel et al.,
2007; Koller et al., 2008). It is currently used for screener cer-
tification at several European airports. The test consists of 256
trials and is based on 128 different color X-ray images of passen-
ger bags, which are each used twice: once without (non-threat
image) and once containing a threat object (threat image). For
more information on the X-Ray CAT see Koller and Schwaninger
(2006). Average detection performance scores (A′)1 of all four
groups were compared using post-hoc pairwise comparisons with
Bonferroni correction. No significant differences between the
groups could be found (all p values >0.05), implying that they
were comparable regarding their image interpretation compe-
tency. The average age of the participants was M = 40.69 years
(SD = 10.78), with a range between 22 and 58 years. 53% of the
participants were female. The average amount of job experience
was M = 4.95 years (SD = 4.49, range: 0.5–23 years). Between-
participants analyses of variance showed no differences between
the experimental groups with regard to age [F(3, 76) = 1.57, p =
0.204, η2 = 0.058] or job experience [F(3, 74) = 0.66, p = 0.579,
η2 = 0.026].
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
All experimental groups conducted a computer-based X-ray
image interpretation test. During the test, color X-ray images of
passenger bags and laptops were displayed, sometimes contain-
ing threats (threat images) and sometimes without any threat
items (non-threat images). Images were displayed in random
order. All participants were exposed to every image and had to
decide whether the bags and laptops could be regarded as harm-
less (OK) or whether they contained a threat item (NOT OK).
Each test condition differed with regard to the factors display
condition (single view vs. motion imaging) and packing con-
dition (laptops inside vs. outside of passenger bags). Figure 2
displays the experimental design of the study. The following four
1For details on the calculation of A′ see section Results and Discussion.
FIGURE 2 | Experimental design (between-participants) for the comparison of the four different conditions.
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different experimental conditions were conducted and compared
to examine the effects and interactions of the above mentioned
two factors using a between-participants design:
(A) Single view images, laptops and passenger bags screened
separately.
(B) Single view images, laptops are left inside the passenger bags.
(C) Motion imaging, laptops and passenger bags screened sepa-
rately.
(D) Motion imaging, laptops are left inside the passenger bags.
In all test conditions the same bags were presented to the screen-
ing officers. Originally, every bag contained a laptop. In condi-
tions A and C the laptops were taken out of the bag and screened
separately, whereas in conditions B and D the laptops were left
inside the passenger bags. This allowed examining the effects of
superposition and bag complexity caused by laptops. Figure 2
illustrates the two different packing conditions (laptop inside vs.
laptop outside).
In conditions A and B, images of the baggage and laptop could
only be seen from one single viewpoint. Conditions C and D
allowed examining the images from different viewpoints through
motion imaging. As explained in the introduction, one impor-
tant objective of this study was to test whether motion imaging
could enhance the inspection of passenger bags to such an extent
that laptops could be left inside passenger bags without affecting
detection performance negatively. Would detection performance
scores still be significantly higher in condition A compared to D,
one could conclude that the detection of threat items is signifi-
cantly impaired when laptops are left inside passenger bags, even
when motion imaging is available.
IMAGE INTERPRETATION TEST
The image interpretation test was based on a representative set2 of
96 passenger bags (defined by screening experts from a specialized
police organization), all of which originally contained laptops.
All test images were recorded with the machine evaluated in this
study. The test images were created and recorded in collaboration
with aviation security experts from a specialized police organiza-
tion and former airport security screening officers now employed
by CASRA. As explained above, in conditions A and C the lap-
tops were taken out of the bags and recorded separately, whereas
in conditions B and D the laptops were left inside the bags. Each
bag/laptop-combination was used twice, once containing a threat
item in either the bag or the laptop, and once without any threat
item. The test contained a representative sample of threat items
selected and developed (the IEDs in laptops) by experts from an
airport police department. These could be divided into four dif-
ferent threat categories: guns, IEDs, knives and other threat items
(e.g., electric shock devices, etc.). For all categories except guns,
in half of the cases the threat items were placed in the bag, while
in the other half of the cases the threat items were placed within
the laptop (see Figure 3). Due to their size, it would not have been
2The set was based on a two-month data collection, assessing the contents
and types of bags that were passing through the security checkpoints at an
international European airport.
FIGURE 3 | Placement of the threat items.
realistic to place guns inside a laptop. Moreover, the factor view-
point was included in the test design. For those threat items placed
inside the bags, half were positioned in easy views and half in
difficult views. Easy view means that threat items were depicted
from a frontal/canonical view in the X-ray image, while for diffi-
cult view the threat items were horizontally or vertically rotated.
All the threat items placed inside the laptop cases were positioned
in easy views. As laptops are comparably flat, it would have been
difficult to place threat items in vertically or horizontally rotated
positions. The IEDs which were placed inside the laptops were
specifically built into the cases. It must be considered that since
an IED consists of several component parts, it becomes more dif-
ficult to determine what the canonical view and thus an easy view
would be. Each threat category contained 24 items. Therefore, the
number of test images for the conditions were the following:
• Tests A and C (laptops and bags screened separately):
4 × 24 threat images (60 bags and 36 laptops)
+96 non threat BAG images
+96 non threat LAPTOP images
= 288 test images
• Tests B and D (laptops inside bags):
4 × 24 combined threat images (60 threats in bags and 36
threats in laptops)
+96 combined non threat images
= 192 test images
PROCEDURE
All participants were invited to the experimenters’ facilities to
conduct the test. Four computer workstations with the corre-
sponding consoles of the tested machine and 19′ TFT monitors
were set up in a normally lit room. X-ray images covered about
2/3 of the computer screen. The distance to the monitor was
∼60 cm. Four participants at a time were tested. Before the test
started, all participants received a short introduction by the test
supervisor, explaining the test procedure and introducing the new
technology of motion imaging. All participants were able to try
out the console and view test images for ∼20min, in order to
become familiar with the images, the technology and the handling
of the console. Pre-testing had shown that this amount of time
was enough to get well acquainted with the console and it was also
recommended by the manufacturer. After a break of 10min the
actual test started. Tests were conducted quietly and individually,
and under supervision. The test images remained on the screen
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until the participant either pressed the “OK” or “NOT OK” and
the “move belt forward” button. RTs were measured in millisec-
onds and correspond to the amount of time it took for a screening
officer to come to a decision and press the “OK” or “NOT OK”
button after the first image pixel of the bag/laptop appeared on
the screen. There was no time limit set for viewing an image.
However, participants were instructed to inspect the images as
quickly and accurately as possible. Breaks of 10min were taken in
30minute-cycles, to avoid eyestrain and fatigue, and to make sure
that especially those participants conducting tests A and C (288
images instead of 192 images, see section Image Interpretation
Test) would not become too tired toward the end. All participants
completed the test in less than 2 h, including breaks.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
According to signal detection theory (Green and Swets, 1966),
there are four possible outcomes to a screener’s response when
judging an X-ray image as either OK or NOT OK: hit, false-
alarm, correct rejection andmiss (Schwaninger, 2003a; Hofer and
Schwaninger, 2004). In this study, A′ was applied as a measure
for detection performance (Pollack and Norman, 1964). A′ is
a measure of sensitivity which is commonly used for a variety
of tasks including screener certification and competency assess-
ments (Hofer and Schwaninger, 2004; Koller and Schwaninger,
2006; Michel et al., 2010). It considers the hit rate as well as the
false-alarm rate and can be calculated using the following formula
(Grier, 1971):
0.5 + [(H − F)(1 + H − F)]/[4H(1 − F)] (1)
0.5 + [(F − H)(1 + F − H)]/[4F(1 − H)] (2)
H is the hit rate and F the false alarm rate. If performance is below
chance, i.e., when H < F, equation (2) must be used (Aaronson
and Watts, 1987).
Due to the security confidential nature of performance values,
these are not displayed in this paper. In order to provide mean-
ingful results, relative differences and effect sizes are reported. All
reported effect sizes are interpreted based on Cohen (1988). For
t-tests, d between 0.20 and 0.49 represents a small effect size; d
between 0.50 and 0.79 represents a medium effect size; d ≥ 0.80
represent a large effect size. For analysis of variance (ANOVA)
statistics, η2 between 0.01 and 0.05 represents a small effect size;
η2 between 0.06 and 0.13 represents a medium effect size; η2 ≥
0.14 represents a large effect size.
COMPARISON OF DETECTION PERFORMANCE BY CONDITION
Figure 4 shows a comparison of detection performance scores
by condition (A, B, C, and D)3. Most remarkable seems to be
3Due to the packing condition, the proportion of target present and target
absent trials differed for conditions A/C and B/D (in conditions A and C the
ratio is 1:2; in conditions B and D the ratio is 1:1). According to signal detec-
tion theory (Green and Swets, 1966), different ratios of target present and
target absent trials can result in a criterion shift (i.e., changes in hit and false
alarm rates). Measures of detection performance in terms of sensitivity such
as d’ and A’ are thought to be relatively independent of criterion shifts, which
could also be shown in studies on target prevalence (e.g., Gur et al., 2003;
FIGURE 4 | Mean detection performance A’ with standard errors of the
mean for all four conditions (A–D). For security reasons, actual A’
performance scores are not reported.
the effect of packing condition. Performance was much better in
conditions A and C, where laptops and bags were screened sepa-
rately, compared to conditions B and D, where laptops were left
inside the passenger bags. The graph also suggests that perfor-
mance was slightly better when motion imaging was available
(condition C compared to A and condition D compared to C,
respectively). The ANOVA with the between-participants factors
display condition (no motion vs. motion) and packing condition
(laptop separate vs. laptop in bag) revealed a large main effect
for packing condition, F(1, 76) = 105.22, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.581,
and a medium main effect for display condition, F(1, 76) = 5.05,
p < 0.05, η2 = 0.062. There was no interaction between display
and packing condition, F(1, 76) = 0.361, p = 0.55, η2 = 0.005.
Thus, althoughmotion imaging enhanced detection performance
slightly, it could not compensate the negative effects on detection
performance resulting from leaving laptops inside bags. Further,
the direct comparison of condition D (motion imaging available,
laptops in bags) and condition A (no motion imaging available,
laptops and bags screened separately) revealed a highly signifi-
cant effect, t(26) = 5.89, p < 0.001, d = 1.86. This also shows that
although motion imaging did improve detection performance (as
shown by the main effect in the ANOVA), the large negative effect
of packing condition could not be compensated.
In sum, the results imply that the packing condition had a
high impact on detection performance. Motion imaging resulted
in better detection but could not fully compensate the effect of
packing condition (i.e., impaired detection when leaving laptops
in passenger bags). The large main effect for packing condi-
tion is consistent with the assumption that the well-documented
effects of superposition and bag complexity (Schwaninger et al.,
2005a,b, 2007; Hardmeier et al., 2005, 2006; Bolfing et al.,
2008; von Bastian et al., 2008) increase when laptops are left
in passenger bags, resulting in impairments of threat detection
performance.
A more detailed analysis was conducted by looking at each
threat category separately. As can be seen in Figure 5, large differ-
ences between conditions, but also between threat categories were
Wolfe et al., 2007; Wolfe and Van Wert, 2010). Therefore, it can be assumed
that the different proportions on target present trials in conditions A/C and
B/D did not affect detection performance (A′) results in this study.
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FIGURE 5 | Mean detection performance A’ with standard errors of the
mean for all four conditions (A–D) and each threat category (guns,
IEDs, knives, others).
Table 1 | Results of the ANOVAs conducted with detection
performance (A′) as dependent variable4.
Detection performance df F η2 p-value
(A)
Threat category (T ) 2.04, 155 186.96 0.711 <0.001
Display condition (D) 1, 76 4.49 0.056 <0.05
Packing condition (P) 1, 76 108.12 0.587 <0.001
T × D 2.04, 155 2.43 0.031 0.09
T × P 2.04, 155 42.21 0.357 <0.001
D × P 1, 76 0.25 0.003 0.62
T × D × P 2.04, 155 1.15 0.015 0.320
(B)
View difficulty (V ) 1, 76 14.23 0.158 <0.001
Threat category (T ) 2.23, 170 122.89 0.618 <0.001
Condition (C) 3, 76 28.78 0.532 <0.001
V × C 3, 76 0.33 0.013 0.805
T × C 6.70, 170 5.07 0.167 <0.001
V × T 2.38, 181 52.03 0.406 <0.001
V × T × C 7.12, 181 2.66 0.095 <0.05
found. A mixed-design ANOVA with the within-participants fac-
tor threat category (guns, IEDs, knives, others) and the between-
participants factors display condition (nomotion vs. motion) and
packing condition (laptop separate vs. laptop in bag) revealed
large significant main effects for the factors threat category and
packing condition and a medium effect for display condition
(for details, see Table 1A). The interaction between threat cate-
gory and packing condition was also highly significant, implying
that leaving laptops in passenger bags affected performance dif-
ferently, depending on threat category. None of the other interac-
tions reached statistical significance. As Figure 5 indicates, IEDs
and other threats were most difficult to detect, especially in con-
ditions B and D. In general, a slight advantage of motion imaging
could be observed (compare condition C to A, and D to B), which
according to Figure 5 was most evident for guns.
4In all analyses of variance in this study were Mauchly’s test indicated that
the assumption of sphericity had been violated, the degrees of freedom were
corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity.
Table 2 | Results of the two-tailed independent samples t-tests
comparing detection performance A′ between conditions A and D for
each threat category (guns, knives, IEDs, others)5.
t (35) t (25) t (27) p d
A–D (guns) 1.22 0.23 0.39
A–D (IEDs) 6.90 <0.001 2.37
A–D (knives) 3.85 <0.01 1.30
A–D (others) 6.13 <0.001 2.10
Additionally, we conducted direct comparisons between con-
ditions D (motion imaging available, laptops in bags) and A (no
motion imaging available, laptops and bags screened separately)
for each threat category, to further examine whether for cer-
tain threat types the negative effect on detection performance of
leaving laptops in bags could be fully compensated by motion
imaging. For all threat categories except guns, large significant
differences were revealed (see Table 2). This further indicates
that even though motion imaging did improve detection perfor-
mance (as shown by the main effect in the ANOVA, see above), it
could not compensate the large negative effect of packing condi-
tion. Only for the detection of guns, motion imaging seemed to
have helped to compensate the negative effect of leaving laptops
in bags (which could explain the marginally significant interac-
tion (p = 0.09) between threat category and display condition in
Table 1A).
As described earlier, half of the threat items were placed inside
laptops and half were placed inside the bags (except for guns,
which could not be place inside laptops). Figure 6 displays how
detection performance differed for each condition with regard
to threat category and the placement of threat items. Again,
threat items were detected better when the bags and laptops were
screened separately (conditions A and C). Planned comparisons
were conducted for each condition and threat category (except
for guns, as all guns were placed inside the bags), to compare
the differences between detection performance with regard to
the placement of threats for each condition (see Table 3). Biggest
differences were found for IEDs. For each condition, detection
performance was worse when the IEDs were built into the laptops,
compared to when they were placed inside the bags. However,
while for conditions A and C detection performance was still
relatively high, the scores achieved in conditions B and D were
much lower for the IEDs within the laptops. For the threat
categories knives and others, in most conditions detection per-
formance was higher when these were placed inside the laptops.
This could be explained by the fact that all threat items placed
within the laptops were positioned in easy views (see Method
section), and thus were easier to recognize. For IEDs, this effect
was not observed. As the IEDs were specifically built into the
laptops and since an IED consists of several component parts,
it becomes more difficult to determine what actually the canon-
ical/frontal view and thus an easy view would be (see Method
section).
5In all t-tests of this study where Levene’s test indicated unequal variances,
degrees of freedom were adjusted using the default procedure in SPSS.
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FIGURE 6 | Mean detection performance A’ with standard errors of the
mean for all four conditions (A–D) with regard to the placement of a
threat item (in bag vs. in laptop) for each threat category (guns, IEDs,
knives, others).
Table 3 | Results of two-tailed paired samples t-tests comparing the
detection performance A’ with regard to the placement of each threat
item (in laptop vs. in bag) for each threat category (guns, IEDs,
knives, others) and each condition (A–D).
t (19) p d
IEDs
A 3.30 <0.01 0.74
B 5.98 <0.001 1.34
C 3.76 <0.01 0.84
D 4.83 <0.001 1.08
KNIVES
A −12.68 <0.001 −2.84
B −7.76 <0.001 −1.73
C −9.07 <0.001 −2.03
D −5.32 <0.001 −1.19
OTHERS
A −14.24 <0.001 −3.18
B −0.31 0.76 −0.07
C −11.23 <0.001 −2.51
D −5.45 <0.001 −1.22
In order to examine the viewpoint effect and whether this
effect was influenced by condition, detection performance scores
of all conditions were compared, broken up by easy vs. difficult
view (see Figure 7). Since all threat items placed inside the laptop
cases were positioned in easy views, this analysis was only con-
ducted for the threat items placed inside the bags. A mixed-design
ANOVA with the within-participants factors view difficulty (easy
vs. difficult view) and threat category (guns, IEDs, knives, oth-
ers) and the between-participants factor condition (A, B, C, D)
revealed large significant main effects for all three factors (see
Table 1B). There was no significant interaction between view dif-
ficulty and condition, while all other interactions were significant.
Therefore, a viewpoint effect could clearly be observed, which dif-
fered with regard to threat category. However, view difficulty was
not significantly affected by condition. Interestingly, as Figure 7
indicates, throughout all conditions guns, IEDs and knives were
detected better when depicted in easy views, while for the cate-
gory others this was the other way around. The category others
FIGURE 7 | Mean detection performance A’ with standard errors of the
mean for all four conditions (A–D) with regard to the view difficulty
(easy vs. difficult view) for each threat category (guns, IEDs, knives,
others). Only threat items which were placed inside the bags are included.
contained a very heterogeneous group of threat items (e.g., pep-
per spray, taser, throwing star, etc.). Hence, it could have been
that the screening officers were more familiar with those threat
items positioned in difficult views, and therefore recognized these
more easily. As Figure 7 further indicates, for the category guns,
motion imaging seemed to have been of help to reduce the view-
point effect (see conditions C and D). This is consistent with the
results reported above (see Table 2) and makes sense if one takes
into account that guns change their shape more drastically than
other objects when rotated. Thus, motion imaging can be more
effective for supporting the recognition of guns.
COMPARISON OF REACTION TIMES BY CONDITION
Figure 8 shows the average reaction times (RTs, converted into
seconds) for all conditions and threat categories. For all cate-
gories, a similar pattern can be observed: More time was needed
in conditions B and D where laptops were left inside the bags.
Most time was needed in condition D, where motion imaging
was available. As Figure 8 implies, remarkable differences can
be observed between the threat categories and conditions. A
repeated-measures ANOVA (see Table 4) revealed large signif-
icant main effects for the factors threat category (guns, IEDs,
knives, others) and condition (A, B, C, D). The interaction
between both factors was also significant, implying that the size
of the differences in RTs between the conditions varied with
regard to threat category. As displayed in Figure 8, all conditions
achieved fastest RTs for the category guns, while longest RTs are
clearly observed for the category IEDs.
To determine which condition actually took the longest time
to complete the test all RTs for each security screener in each
condition were summed and averaged across screening officers.
Figure 9 displays these results. As described in the Method sec-
tion, for test conditions A and C where laptops and bags were
displayed separately, 288 images were displayed. In test conditions
B and D, 192 images were shown. Even though fewer images were
viewed in condition D, compared to conditions A and C, alto-
gether, more time was needed to inspect these test images. While
conditions A, B, and C did not differ from each other significantly,
large differences were observed between each of these three con-
ditions with condition D (see Table 5). These results indicate that
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 654 | 7
Mendes et al. Motion imaging for X-ray security screening
FIGURE 8 | Mean reaction times (s) with standard errors of the mean
for all four conditions (A–D) broken up by threat categories (guns,
knives, IEDs, others).
Table 4 | Results of the repeated-measures ANOVA conducted with
reaction time (RT).
Reaction time df F η2 p-value
Threat category (T ) 1.89, 144 155.04 0.671 <0.001
Condition (C) 3, 76 25.26 0.499 <0.001
T × C 5.67, 144 8.11 0.242 <0.001
even though fewer images had to be viewed when laptops were
kept in passenger bags, altogether more time was needed to apply
motion imaging and investigate these images thoroughly. Thus,
while motion imaging provides a security advantage, it comes
with a certain cost of efficiency.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The benefits of an X-ray machine featuring a new technology
offering multiple views of X-ray images andmotion imaging were
evaluated and compared to single view imaging. In specific, it
was investigated whether leaving laptops inside passenger bags
resulted in a decrease of detection performance and whether such
an effect could be compensated by motion imaging. The results
revealed that threat detection performance was much better when
laptops and bags were screened separately (see also Mendes et al.,
2012). Leaving laptops inside passenger bags resulted in a clear
decrease of threat detection performance, supporting the view
that increases in superposition and bag complexity affect detec-
tion performance negatively (Schwaninger et al., 2005b, 2007;
Bolfing et al., 2008). Motion imaging technology could slightly
improve threat detection performance. Yet, it could not compen-
sate the negative effect of leaving laptops inside bags. Highest
detection performance was achieved when motion imaging was
available and laptops and bags were screened separately.
More detailed analyses indicate that performance differed
remarkably with regard to the different threat categories [guns,
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), knives, others]. IEDs and
the others threat category were most difficult to detect, espe-
cially when laptops were not removed from passenger bags. Only
a small advantage of motion imaging was observed. Merely for
the detection of guns, motion imaging seemed to be of substan-
tial benefit. Further analyses regarding the placement of threat
items (in bag vs. in laptop) indicated that IEDs were particularly
FIGURE 9 | Sum of reaction times (s) averaged across participants with
standard errors of the mean for all four conditions (A–D).
Table 5 | Results of pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction
for the sums of reaction times (in seconds) of all four conditions
(SPSS Bonferroni adjusted p-values are quoted).
Comparison Mean difference RT SE p d
A–B −58 207.5 1.000 −0.09
A–C −231 207.5 1.000 −0.32
A–D −802 207.5 <0.01 −1.14
B–C −173 207.5 1.000 −0.29
B–D −744 207.5 <0.01 −1.08
C–D −570 207.5 <0.05 −0.84
difficult to detect when these were built into the laptop cases.
Specifically when laptops were left inside the bags, threat detec-
tion performance was quite low compared to when the laptops
were displayed separately. Thus, when no automatic explosives
detection is available and laptops are not removed from passen-
ger bags, the detection of explosives and bombs, in particular, is
impaired. For the categories knives and others, detection perfor-
mance was higher when these were placed inside the laptops. This
could be due to the fact that—for practical reasons—all threat
items placed inside the laptops had to be positioned in easy views
(canonical views). In general, threat items depicted in more dif-
ficult views were harder to detect. These findings are consistent
with previous research on viewpoint effects, which showed that
recognition of items depicted in frontal/canonical view is easier
(e.g., Michel et al., 2007; Bolfing et al., 2008; Koller et al., 2008).
Only for the category others, this effect was the other way round.
As the category others contained a very heterogeneous group of
threat items, possibly screening officers were more familiar with
the items positioned in difficult views and thus detected these bet-
ter. Results also showed that in general more time was needed
to inspect the images when laptops were left inside the bags.
Longest RTs were found when laptops were not removed from
bags and motion imaging was applied. Thus, providing addi-
tional views is paid for by increasing RT (see also von Bastian
et al., 2008). Even though fewer images were viewed when lap-
tops were left inside the passenger bags, altogether more time was
needed to apply motion imaging and inspect these images prop-
erly. Keeping factors such as throughput and efficiency at security
checkpoints in mind, screening time is an important point to
consider.
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Technology for security screening will constantly be devel-
oped further. Yet, the final decision on whether threat items
are contained in luggage still rely on human operators, who
inspect the luggage based on an image provided by a machine.
The presented study underlines the importance of thoroughly
evaluating any new technological features with regard to their
added value provided to the screening officers, prior to imple-
menting these in the airport environment. In this study, only a
slight benefit of motion imaging technology was revealed. No
real advantage could be observed for the detection of IEDs, while
the results do suggest that for certain objects such as guns, the
rotation and availability of different viewpoints through motion
imaging could improve identification. As previous research has
shown (e.g., Michel et al., 2007) guns change their shape more
drastically than other objects when rotated. Thus, one could
assume that motion imaging would possibly be more helpful also
for the detection of other threat types if larger rotations and
more views are available (or even fully rotatable 3D images, see
below).
All in all, the detection of threat items in cabin baggage screen-
ing currently still seems more reliable when laptops are taken out
of passenger bags. Therefore, the outcomes of this study under-
line the appropriateness and importance of current regulations
specifying that portable computers should be removed from
passenger bags for X-ray screening. However, this might be recon-
sidered if effective and efficient automatic threat detection is
available, which is particularly important for IEDs (see e.g., Singh
and Singh, 2003; Eilbert, 2009; Mery et al., 2013). Furthermore,
if more rotation in depth would be available, higher benefits
could possibly be expected, which is of particular importance
regarding new technological developments such as computer
tomography offering 3D views. Effects of superposition and view-
point could be reduced further and RTs could be decreased if
screening officers can directly navigate to their preferred view of a
bag image. In combination with automated threat detection this
could possibly result in substantially higher human-machine sys-
tem performance (see e.g., Flitton et al., 2010; Megherbi et al.,
2010). However, this would have to be examined in further
studies.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We are thankful to aviation security experts from the German
Federal Police Technology Center for providing their valuable
expertise and support for the creation and recording of x-ray
images. We thank Zurich State Police, Airport Division, for pro-
viding screeners and supporting this study.
REFERENCES
Aaronson, D., and Watts, B. (1987).
Extension of Grier’s computational
formulas for A’ and B” to below-
chance performance. Psychol. Bull.
102, 439–442. doi: 10.1037/0033-
2909.102.3.439
Biederman, I. (1987). Recognition-by-
components: a theory of human
image understanding. Psychol. Rev.
94, 115–147. doi: 10.1037/0033-
295X.94.2.115
Blanz, V., Tarr, M. J., Bülthoff, H.
H., and Vetter, T. (1999). What
object attributes determine canon-
ical views? Perception 28, 575–600.
doi: 10.1068/p2897
Bolfing, A., Halbherr, T., and
Schwaninger, A. (2008). “How
image based factors and human
factors contribute to threat
detection performance in X-ray
aviation security screening,” in
HCI and Usability for Education
and Work Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Vol. 5298, ed
A. Holzinger (Berlin; Heidelberg:
Springer-Verlag), 419–438. doi:
10.1007/978-3-540-89350-9_30
Brown, W., Emery, T., Gergory, M.,
Hackett, R., Yates, C., and Ling, J.
(1995). Advanced Physics: Practical
Guide. Harlow: Longman.
Bülthoff, H. H., and Edelman, S.
(1992). Psychophysical support for a
two-dimensional view interpolation
theory of object recognition. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 89, 60–64.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.89.1.60
Bülthoff, I., and Bülthoff, H. H.
(2006). “Objektwahrnehmung,”
in Handbuch der Allgemeinen
Psychologie – Kognition, eds J. Funke
and P. A. Frensch (Göttingen:
Hogrefe Verlag), 165–172.
Burgund, E. D., and Marsolek, C.
J. (2000). Viewpoint-invariant and
viewpoint-dependent object recog-
nition in dissociable neural subsys-
tems. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 7, 480–489.
doi: 10.3758/BF03214360
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical Power
Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences.
New York, NY: Erlbaum, Hillsdale.
Edelman, S., and Bülthoff, H. H.
(1992). Orientation depen-
dence in the recognition of
familiar and novel views of
three-dimensional objects.
Vision Res. 32, 2385–2400. doi:
10.1016/0042-6989(92)90102-O
Eilbert, R. F. (2009). “Chapter 6 –
X-ray technologies,” in Aspects of
Explosives Detection, eds M. M.
Marshall and J. C. Oxley (Oxford:




No 185/2010 of March 2010 laying
down detailed measures for the
implementation of the common
basic standards on aviation security.
Official J. Eur. Union 53, 1–55.
Flitton, G. T., Breckon, T. P., and
Bouallagu, N. M. (2010). “Object
recognition using 3D SIFT in com-
plex CT volumes,” in Proceedings
of the British Machine Vision
Conference, eds F. Labrosse,
R. Zwiggelaar, Y. Liu, and B.
Tiddeman (BMVA Press), 1–12.
doi:10.5244/C.24.11
Graf, M., Schwaninger, A., Wallraven,
C., and Bülthoff, H. H. (2002).
Psychophysical Results from
Experiments on Recognition and
Categorisation. Information Society
Technologies (IST) Programme,
Cognitive Vision Systems CogVis
(IST-2000–29375), Tübingen: Max
Planck Institute for Biological
Cybernetics.
Graves, I., Butavicius, M., Mac
Leod, V., Heyer, R., Parsons, K.,
Kuester, N., et al. (2011). “The
role of the human operator in
image-based airport security
technologies,” in Innovations
in Defence Support Systems –
Socio-Technical Systems, Studies in
Computational Intelligence, Vol. 338,
eds L. C Jain, E. V. Aidman, and
C. Abeynake (Berlin; Heidelberg:
Springer Verlag), 147–181. doi:
10.1007/978-3-642-17764-4_5
Green, D. M., and Swets, J. A. (1966).
Signal Detection Theory and
Psychophysics. New York, NY: Wiley.
Grier, J. B. (1971). Nonparametric
indexes for sensitivity and bias:
computing formulas. Psychol. Bull.
75, 424–429. doi: 10.1037/h0031246
Gur, D., Rockette, H. E., Armfield,
D. R., Blachar, A., Bogan,
J. K., Brancatelli, G., et al.
(2003). Prevalence effect in
a laboratory environment1.
Radiology 228, 10–14. doi:
10.1148/radiol.2281020709
Hardmeier, D., Hofer, F., and
Schwaninger, A. (2005). The x-
ray object recognition test (x-ray
ort) – a reliable and valid instru-
ment for measuring visual abilities
needed in x-ray screening. IEEE
ICCST Proc. 39, 189–192.
Hardmeier, D., Hofer, F., and
Schwaninger, A. (2006). “Increased
detection performance in airport
security screening using the X-Ray
ORT as pre-employment assess-
ment tool” in Proceedings of the 2nd
International Conference on Research
in Air Transportation, ICRAT 2006
(Belgrade), 393–397.
Hofer, F., and Schwaninger, A. (2004).
Reliable and valid measures of
threat detection performance in X-
ray screening. IEEE ICCST Proc. 38,
303–308.
Humphrey, G. K., and Khan, S. C.
(1992). Recognizing novel views
of three-dimensional objects.
Can. J. Psychol. 46, 170–190. doi:
10.1037/h0084320
Koller, S., and Schwaninger, A. (2006).
“Assessing X-ray image interpreta-
tion competency of airport security
screeners,” Proceedings of the 2nd
International Conference on Research
in Air Transportation, ICRAT 2006
(Belgrade), 399–402.
Koller, S. M., Hardmeier, D., Michel,
S., and Schwaninger, A. (2008).
Investigating training, transfer, and
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 654 | 9
Mendes et al. Motion imaging for X-ray security screening
viewpoint effects resulting from
recurrent CBT of X-ray image
interpretation. J. Transp. Secur. 1,
81–106. doi: 10.1007/s12198-007-
0006-4
Kosslyn, S. M. (1994). Image and
Brain. The Resolution of the Imagery
Debate. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press.
Kravitz, D. J., Vinson, L. D., and Baker,
C. I. (2008). How position depen-
dent is visual object recognition?
Trends Cogn. Sci. 12, 114–122. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2007.12.006
Marr, D. (1982). Vision. San Francisco,
CA: Freeman.
Marr, D., and Nishihara, H. K. (1978).
Representation and recognition
of the spatial organization of
three-dimensional shapes. Proc.
R. Soc. Lond. B 200, 269–294. doi:
10.1098/rspb.1978.0020
Megherbi, N., Flitton, G. T., and
Breckon, T. P. (2010). “A classifier
based approach for the detection
of potential threats in CT based
baggage screening,” in Proceedings
of the 17th IEEE International
Conference on Image Processing
(ICIP), (Hong Kong), 1833–1836.
doi: 10.1109/ICIP.2010.5653676
Mendes, M., Schwaninger, A., Strebel,
N., and Michel, S. (2012). “Why
laptops should be screened sep-
arately when conventional x-ray
screening is used,” in Proceedings
of the 46th IEEE International
Carnahan Conference on Security
Technology (Boston, MA). doi:
10.1109/CCST.2012.6393571
Mery, D., Mondragon, G., Riffo, V., and
Zuccar, I. (2013). Detection of regu-
lar objects in baggage using multiple
X-ray views. Insight 55, 16–20. doi:
10.1784/insi.2012.55.1.16
Michel, S., de Ruiter, J. C., Hogervorst,
M., Koller, S. M., Moerland,
R., and Schwaninger, A. (2007).
“Computer-based training increases
efficiency in X-ray image interpreta-
tion by aviation security screeners,”
in Proceedings of the 41st Carnahan
Conference on Security Technology
(Ottawa).
Michel, S., Mendes, M., and
Schwaninger, A. (2010). “Can
the difficulty level reached in
computer-based training predict
results in x-ray image interpretation
tests?,” in Proceedings of the 44th
Carnahan Conference on Security
Technology (San Jose, CA).
Michel, S., and Schwaninger, A.
(2009). “Human machine inter-
action in X-ray screening,” in
Proceedings of the 43rd IEEE
International Carnahan Conference
on Security Technology (Zurich).
doi: 10.1109/CCST.2009.5335572
Mitsumatsu, H., and Yokosawa, K.
(2003). Efficient extrapolation of
the view with a dynamic and
predictive stimulus. Perception 32,
969–983. doi: 10.1068/p5068
Palmer, S., Rosch, E., and Chase,
P. (1981). “Canonical perspective
and the perception of objects,” in
Attention and Performance IX, eds J.
Long and A. Baddeley (Hillside, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum), 135–151.
Peissig, J. J., and Tarr, M. J. (2007).
Visual object recognition: do we
know more than we did 20 years
ago? Annu. Rev. Psychol. 58, 75–96.
doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.58.
102904.190114
Pike, G. E., Kemp, R. I., Towell, N.
A., and Phillips, K. C. (1997).
Recognizing moving faces: the
relative contribution of motion
and perspective view informa-
tion. Vis. Cogn. 4, 409–437. doi:
10.1080/713756769
Poggio, T., and Edelman, S. (1990).
A network that learns to recog-
nize three-dimensional objects.
Nature 343, 263–266. doi:
10.1038/343263a0
Pollack, I., andNorman, D. A. (1964). A
non-parametric analysis of recogni-






B. Kersten (Bern: Huber), 108–132.
Schwaninger, A. (2003a). Reliable
measurement of threat detection.
Airport 1, 22–23.
Schwaninger, A. (2003b). Evaluation
and selection of airport security
screeners. Airport 2, 14–15.
Schwaninger, A., Hardmeier, D., and
Hofer, F. (2005a). Aviation security
screeners visual ablilities and visual
knowledge measurement. IEEE
Aerosp. Electron. Syst. 20, 29–35.
Schwaninger, A., Michel, S., and
Bolfing, A. (2005b). Towards a
model for estimating image dif-
ficulty in x-ray screening. IEEE
ICCST Proc. 39, 185–188. doi:
10.1109/CCST.2005.1594875
Schwaninger, A., Michel, S., and
Bolfing, A. (2007). “A statistical
approach for image difficulty
estimation in X-ray screening
using image measurements,” in
Proceedings of the 4th Symposium
on Applied Perception in Graphics
and Visualization (New York,
NY: ACM Press), 123–130. doi:
10.1145/1272582.1272606
Singh, S., and Singh, M. (2003).
Explosives detection systems
(EDS) for aviation security.
Signal Process. 83, 31–55. doi:
10.1016/S0165-1684(02)00391-2
Tarr, M. J. (1995). Rotating objects to
recognize them: a case study on the
role of viewpoint dependency in the
recognition of three-dimensional
objects. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 2, 55–82.
doi: 10.3758/BF03214412
Ullmann, S. (1979). The Interpretation
of Visual Motion. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
von Bastian, C. C., Schwaninger, A.,
and Michel, S. (2008). Do multi-
view X-ray systems improve X-
ray image interpretation in airport
security screening? Zeitschrift für
Arbeitswissenschaft 3, 166–173.
von Bastian, C. C., Schwaninger, A.,
and Michel, S. (2010). Color impact
on security screening. Aerospace
Electron. Syst. Mag. 25, 33–38. doi:
10.1109/MAES.2010.5631724
Vuong, Q. C., and Tarr, J. T.
(2004). Rotation direction
affects object recognition.
Vision Res. 44, 1717–1730. doi:
10.1016/j.visres.2004.02.002
Wolfe, J. M., Horowitz, T. S., Van Wert,
M. J., Kenner, N. M., Place, S. S.,
and Kibbi, N. (2007). Low target
prevalence is a stubborn source of
errors in visual search tasks. J. Exp.
Psychol. Gen. 136, 623–638. doi:
10.1037/0096-3445.136.4.623
Wolfe, J. M., and Van Wert, M. J.
(2010). Varying target preva-
lence reveals two dissociable
decision criteria in visual search.
Curr. Biol. 20, 121–124. doi:
10.1016/j.cub.2009.11.066
Yoo, K. E. (2009). “Screening on the
ground, security in the sky,” in
Protecting Airline Passengers in the
Age of Terrorism, eds P. Seidenstat
and F. X. Splane (Santa Barbara,
CA: Praeger Security International),
63–85.
Yoo, K. E., and Choi, Y. C. (2006).
Analytic hierarchy process approach
for identifying relative importance
of factors to improve passenger
security checks at airports. J. Air
Transp. Manag. 12, 135–142. doi:
10.1016/j.jairtraman.2005.11.006
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 31 May 2013; paper pend-
ing published: 22 July 2013; accepted:
19 September 2013; published online: 18
October 2013.
Citation: Mendes M, Schwaninger A and
Michel S (2013) Can laptops be left
inside passenger bags if motion imag-
ing is used in X-ray security screen-
ing? Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:654. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2013.00654
This article was submitted to the journal
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2013 Mendes,
Schwaninger and Michel. This is an
open-access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other
forums is permitted, provided the orig-
inal author(s) or licensor are credited
and that the original publication in
this journal is cited, in accordance with
accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permit-
ted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 654 | 10
